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From:	European Union Military Staff
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Pursuant to the EU Maritime Dimension Study TORs (doc. 14105/05 dated 8 November 2005), delegations will find attached the draft EU Maritime Dimension Study, produced by the EUMS, supported by experts from Member States. Revision 2 of the paper has been prepared with due regard to Delegation's comments on Revision 1 during the discussion at the 6th Maritime Dimension Workshop.

References:

- A.** Treaty on European Union.
- B.** The European Security Strategy (doc. 15895/032, dated December 2003).
- C.** Terms of Reference and Methodology for a study of the Maritime Dimension in ESDP (doc. 14105/05, dated 8 November 2005).
- D.** Military Recommendation on the Implementation of Additional Military Tasks Foreseen in the European Security Strategy (doc. 6202/04, dated 11 February 2004).
- E.** Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 6309/6/04 REV 6, dated 4 May 2004).
- F.** Requirement Catalogue 05 (doc. 13732/05, dated 7 November 2005).
- G.** An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs. (dated 3 October 2006).¹
- H.** General Principles and Procedures for EU Force Identification, Generation/Activation and Deployment (doc. 12398/02, dated 26 September 2002).

¹ The subject reference was discussed by the European Defence Agency Steering Board on 3 October 2006 and endorsed as a reasonable foundation for the EDA's medium-to-long term agendas. In doing so the participating Member States in the Steering Board noted that the LTV document was explicitly an initial, non committing document. The Steering Board endorsement does not mean that all participating Member States have agreed all particulars.

STUDY BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following documents were consulted during the Study:

1. Terms of Reference and Methodology for a study of the Maritime Dimension in ESDP (doc. 14105/05, dated 8 November 2005).
2. Roadmap for the Maritime Dimension in ESDP Study (doc. CCD 02-28/03-07 OPS 185/05 dated 14 Dec 05).
3. Treaty on European Union.
4. The European Security Strategy (doc. 15895/032, dated December 2003).
5. Headline Goal 2010 (doc. 6309/6/04 REV 6, dated 4 May 2004).
6. Requirement Catalogue 05 (doc. 13732/05 dated 7 Nov 05).
7. Military Advice for PSC on the RC05 Strategic Planning Assumptions (doc. 13237/05 dated 13 Oct 05).
8. An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and capacity Needs (dated 3 October 2006).²
9. 'Green Paper' of the Commission of the European Communities - 'Towards a future Maritime Policy for the EU: A European vision for the oceans and seas' (COM (2006) 275 final, dated 7 June 2006).³

² The subject reference was discussed by the European Defence Agency Steering Board on 3 October 2006 and endorsed as a reasonable foundation for the EDA's medium-to-long term agendas. In doing so the participating Member States in the Steering Board noted that the LTV document was explicitly an initial, non committing document. The Steering Board endorsement does not mean that all participating Member States have agreed all particulars.

³ The Green Paper is a consultation paper with the consultation period ending 30 June 2007. It aims to launch a debate about a future Maritime Policy for the EU that treats the oceans and seas in a holistic way and wishes to base its further work in this area on the views of stakeholders. By the end of 2007, the Commission will address a Communication to the Council and Parliament summarising the results of the consultation process and proposing the way forward.

10. EU Military Rapid Response Concept (doc. 5641/1/03 REV 1, dated 16 September 2003).
11. Report on Rapid Response for MinDef's Informal Meeting on 14-15 Mar 03 (doc. 7289/03 dated 12 Mar 03).
12. SG/HR report on accelerated decision making and planning process for EU Rapid Response Operations (doc. 7317/05 dated 15 Mar 05).
13. Military Advice on SG/HR report on accelerated decision making and planning process for EU Rapid Response Operations (doc. 8397/05 dated 25 Apr 05).
14. EU Framework Nation Concept (doc. 11278/02 dated 25 Jul 02).
15. EU Battlegroups Concept (doc. 10501/1/04 REV 1 dated 19 Jul 05).
16. General Principles and Procedures for EU Force Identification, Generation/Activation and Deployment (doc. 12398/02 dated 26 Sep 02).
17. EU Military C2 Concept (doc. 11096/03 dated 3 Jul 03).
18. Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management (doc. 11127/03 dated 3 Jul 03).
19. The Maritime Dimension of European Joint Operations (CHEN's doc. final version dated 11 Jan 02).
20. A Vision for the Future Role of European Maritime Forces (CHENS document) (dated May 2005).

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ENCLOSURES:

1. EU Maritime Contribution and Capabilities within the ESDP Mission Spectrum
(doc. CCD 02-28/03-07 OPS 081/3/06 REV 3, dated 7 November 2006).
2. EU Maritime Forces in a Rapid Response Capacity
(doc. CCD 02-28/03-07 OPS 034/2/06 REV 2, dated 12 December 2006).
3. EU Member State's Maritime Forces - Future Structure and Shape
(doc. 02-28/03-07 OPS 106/2/06 REV 2, dated 12 December 2006).

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The sea and the EU's extensive littoral region will remain a key dimension in both economic and security terms. Significant threats, increasingly asymmetric in nature, can both emanate in and utilise the maritime domain to impact on both the EU and its constituent MSs.
2. With the adoption by the European Council in December 2003 of the European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU affirmed the role it wants to play in the world. In this context Member States (MS) recognised the threats and dangers of the international security environment and acknowledged the crucial role that military assets often play in crisis management.
3. Maritime forces have a role to guarantee the free use of the sea, which is key to the EU's economic prosperity and access to areas of strategic interest. The utility of maritime capability is its ability to use the unique access provided by the sea to enable movement, concentration of combat power, surprise or overt presence and transportation. It is therefore able to deliver the necessary effect to support the achievement of the EU's political strategic objectives, either with a specific limited and focussed maritime operation or as part of a larger joint force. Maritime forces give political and operational decision makers a wide range of choices in the delivery of political and/or military leverage without necessarily making a decisive and often irreversible commitment, including the ability to poise.⁴ The real essence to the effective use of maritime capability is for decision-makers and joint planners to recognise this.

B. BASIS

4. The EUMC tasked the EUMS to undertake a Maritime Dimension Study in order to '*produce a better understanding of present and future maritime missions, requirements and capabilities*'.⁵

⁴ Poise - an attribute of a Maritime force to remain on station for long periods whilst retaining the flexibility and ability to influence events, pursuant to political requirements.

⁵ Reference C, para 1.

5. In order to provide a more logical flow to the findings of the Study, this paper will address the 3 objectives given at Reference C in the following order:

- Explore within the ESDP mission spectrum where maritime military capabilities could make a contribution, including non-military oriented missions/operations;
- Investigate the use of EU Maritime Forces in a Rapid Response capacity, including recommendations on force packages, force generation procedures and readiness;
- Analyse the effect of HLG 2010, RC 05, the resulting Progress Catalogue and the LTV process on the future structure and shape of EU Member States maritime forces.

6. The Study has been produced by the EUMS supported by MS experts, as well as representation from the Commission. The EUMS has endeavoured to provide a platform from which the work could be developed, to acknowledge and incorporate the views, and mitigate the concerns of MSs. The Study has been fruitful and valuable, and has achieved a noteworthy amount of common understanding on a significant extent of the ground covered in addressing the Study objectives. Notwithstanding this, there are some issues that require further work. On the basis of the findings, the Study will make recommendations to the EUMC.

C. PURPOSE

7. The purpose of this paper is to harness the key tenets of the three supporting papers.

D. SCOPE

8. The paper will remain cognisant of the purpose of the Maritime Dimension Study.⁶ Although the guidance for the Study called for a 'comprehensive study', and whilst recognising the need to take account of ongoing complementary initiatives, the following explicit constraints were noted:

- a. The outcomes should be in support of ESDP missions as foreseen in Art 17 of the TEU and the ESS;

⁶ Reference C, para 1.

- b. The Study should not seek to reopen issues decided in the Requirement Catalogue (RC) and Force Catalogue (FC) development work;
- c. The Study should not duplicate current initiatives.

E. FINDINGS

9. Explore, within the ESDP mission spectrum, where maritime military capabilities could make a contribution: The results of this work are at Enclosure 1. The key attributes of maritime assets and capabilities are tactical self-sufficiency, independence from host nation support and their inherent sustainability.⁷ Maritime forces can be nationally pre-deployed, overtly or covertly; they can deploy, withdraw and re-deploy, simply by exercising freedom of navigation and can be used for power projection and if necessary poise,⁸ thereby giving political and operational decision makers a wide range of operational choices without the need to make a decisive and often irreversible commitment to a course of action or exit plan. Maritime assets are able to provide a range of capabilities that have utility across the spectrum of EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO) and can be swiftly and flexibly task-tailored. They are routinely able to transit to and arrive in the required Joint Operations Area (JOA) fully operational, acclimatised and operating on the basis of common concepts and standard procedures. These characteristics provide political and operational decision makers with a wide range of strategic and operational options and freedom to deliver the desired

⁷ Sustainability - the ability to operate for extended periods at considerable distance from shore support.

⁸ Before the build up of EU joint forces in a JOA, the presence of maritime forces can be used to deter further escalation, especially against a friendly and adjacent host nation. Maritime forces can be used to deter an aggressor by deploying into a region at an early stage, at relatively low political risk and, if necessary, in considerable strength. This is the principal reason why many MS forward-deploy their maritime forces globally rather than keep them at home. The freedom of the sea, freedom for use, freedom from boundaries and frontiers is why the sea is so valuable an arena for joint force manoeuvre. In preparation for subsequent operations, maritime forces can be employed to both gather intelligence and mount non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), withdrawing civilians from a potentially hostile crisis area. Maritime sealift can be used to build-up forces in the JOA whilst maritime forces can demonstrate further resolve by launching discrete amounts of mixed land, air or sea force against key targets, to prevent or impede a potential aggressor from using force. Importantly they can do this with a measure of control over factors that might otherwise lead to a major escalation. Maritime power, as well as supporting operations on shore, can prevent crises from starting or preclude their escalation.

effects at a time of political choosing. In the preliminary stages of an emerging crisis, where timely influence, deterrence, coercion or military intervention may help to prevent deterioration into conflict or mitigate the effects of a disaster, the early presence of a maritime force can be a significant factor in providing the necessary political and/or military leverage.

10. There was a general understanding that maritime assets and capabilities could have a role throughout the ESDP Mission Spectrum. Pursuant to the purpose of the Study, and in the spirit of the 'strategic culture' sought in the ESS,⁹ it was considered that it may be valuable, whilst remaining fully cognisant of the guidance at Reference A, to briefly explore the utility of maritime military capability in support to areas beyond these precise bounds. However, it should be noted that views differ on the breadth of the ESDP Mission Spectrum. To this end, potential maritime military support to operations and activities beyond the precise limit set in the Study 's TORs have been dealt with separately in a distinct chapter of Enclosure 1.
11. Within this context, the Study recognised the importance of the maritime domain to European security, prosperity and economic stability and acknowledged the disruptive threats posed by current and emerging illegal and criminal activity. A more coherent multinational inter-agency approach to maritime security operations (MSO), including the support of the necessary and appropriate military capabilities, might better safeguard common prosperity and security interests by protecting and supporting legitimate activities whilst countering the threat of current and emerging hostile, illegal, criminal or dangerous acts within the maritime domain. The considerations and findings of this work cannot be taken as MS concurrence with respect to the delineation of what is considered within and outwith the ESDP Mission Spectrum, which is a political issue for MSs.
12. Investigate the use of EU Maritime Forces in a Rapid Response capacity: The results of this work are at Enclosure 2. The Study identified that there is significant value and utility in the early engagement of maritime assets. However, in order to further maritime rapid response, it is considered necessary to refine the maritime element of the Force Catalogue by identifying and verifying those assets being held at the necessary readiness (5-10 days), from which rapid response mission requirements could be drawn. The Study found that the nature of maritime resources is such that many maritime assets will have a multi-role capability and have

⁹ Reference B, pages 4-5.

applicability across the full range of EU CMO, both on the high seas and within the littoral, and must therefore be available in sufficient capacity to meet the agreed concurrency requirements. It requires decision-makers to understand the capabilities of maritime resources in order to optimise their use to best effect.

13. The Study found that there are two feasible rapid response force generation options, namely an On-call Force and a Maritime Rapid Response Mechanism (MRRM). Notwithstanding the inherent flexibility provided by maritime forces, the first option is considered to stand a risk of providing a force that is not mission-tailored, resulting in limited effect. There was no consensus by MS in support of this option which was considered to place undue burden on finite MS maritime resources and to take for granted MS participation in a particular crisis. The second option provides the possibility of mission-tailoring the maritime contribution although its success is dependent on rapid and transparent decision-making in order to meet the foreseen rapid response timelines. There was a broader MS consensus on this option. Taking account of the advantages and disadvantages of both options the Study's preferred option is the MRRM.
14. The utility of the MRRM is in being able to exploit the flexibility in the EU Decision-making and Force Generation Processes, including , in particular, the provision of access to the appropriate C2 at all levels. Without this exploitation the MRRM will not have the capability to realise the benefits of early deployment, although this may be mitigated by the use of the Framework Nation Concept, which, through the force generation mechanism, may be particularly appropriate in operations in which **urgency** is an important criterion i.e. rapid response. Further, there are a number of legacy multinational naval forces and initiatives that populate the European maritime forces chart. These formations were developed on a bilateral or multinational basis, serving MS interests, before the establishment of ESDP structures. Although these initiatives do not link directly with ESDP and a number of MS are not represented, they could bring additional value in this context.
15. Notwithstanding the work done by the Study, there are a number of issues which need to be developed further, such as: C2, including use of the Framework Nation Concept; concurrency, including support to EU Battlegroups; and force generation, including use of force packaging. A compendium of MS comments pursuant to Enclosure 2 is at Annex E to Enclosure 2.

16. Analyse the effect of the HLG and Long Term Vision processes on the future structure and shape of MS maritime forces: The results of this work are at Enclosure 3. Whilst it is acknowledged that the future structure and shape of EU MS maritime forces is not an issue within the remit of the EU per se, it does have a vested interest in MSs having the capacity to provide appropriate capabilities in a timely manner in order to meet EU crisis management requirements. Key to meeting this need are appropriate force generation mechanisms that facilitate visibility and clarity of available potential forces, assets and capabilities. In the normal course, this requirement is met by Reference H, which details EU Force Generation principles and procedures, and the HLG process; however, future force generation requirements are likely to require a more responsive process able to facilitate timely preventative engagement, thereby precluding the deterioration of a potential crisis situation and reducing the subsequent consequence management efforts. To this end Reference H should be open to revision based on future operational requirements. Taking this into account, it is considered that the inherent flexibility in MS maritime forces is such that they are well placed to support change in the future evolving security environment. Although some shortfall capabilities already identified within the current HLG process are likely to come under increasing pressure. A detailed risk assessment will be completed as part of the HLG Scrutinising, Analysis and Evaluation process and then captured in the Progress Catalogue.
17. In order to meet its aspirations as a global crisis response actor, the EU needs to act early, rapidly and, when necessary, robustly in its interventions. To support the breadth of potential EU crisis management operations, including its ability to integrate with other EU instruments and partners, it will be necessary for MS to be able to generate the appropriate maritime capabilities, including combat capabilities, to act decisively, including in the case of re-emerging regular conventional threats. These capabilities will need to be able to operate on the high seas, but also in littoral areas and will increasingly need to be appropriately networked, with a capability to plug into a Joint and even a civil-military environment. MS's maritime forces should be capable of the timely projection and sustainment of mission tailored forces over strategic distances.¹⁰

¹⁰ In accordance with Reference I, on the basis of guidelines provided by the ESS and operational experience, strategic distances can be considered to be those distances between place of force generation and the theatre of operations and can be assumed to be between 4000 and 15000 km subject to mission type.

G. RECOMMENDATIONS

18. It is recommended that the EUMC notes the Study and agrees the recommendations below:
- a. to task the EUMS to further develop a Maritime Rapid Response Concept on the basis of Enclosure 2, noting the MRRM as a priority for development;
 - b. determine, from a military perspective, the requirements for follow-on conceptual work on the military contribution to a multinational, inter-agency approach to maritime security, in particular inter-pillar mutual support and information exchange, taking note of Enclosure 1.
19. Finally, it is recommended, in pursuance of the purpose of the Study, that the EUMC agree to distribute the Study as widely as possible.
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