



HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
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JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0

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I – INTRODUCTION

1. Military mobility ensures the swift and seamless movement of military personnel and materiel – within and beyond the EU. It is vital for the EU’s security and defence in both the short and long-term. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has continued to highlight the importance of military mobility in times of crisis. The Russian invasion also demonstrates how crucial it is to simplify and harmonise procedures of moving military assets and equipment in order to respond quickly and at scale to crises erupting at the EU’s external borders and beyond. Military Mobility is one of the priorities of the updated 2023 Capability Development Plan (CDP), as approved by Member States in November 2023. The CDP highlighted the urgent need to substantially improve the military mobility of Member States Armed Forces, within and beyond the EU, *inter alia*, focusing on strengthening where dual use transport infrastructure across the trans-European transport network.
2. The EU Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0¹ provides a comprehensive framework to develop a well-connected military mobility network, with shorter reaction times and capable, secure, sustainable and resilient transport infrastructure and capabilities. The European Defence Industrial Strategy from March 2024 indicates the need to address the remaining bottlenecks to a swift, efficient and unimpeded movement of military equipment and capabilities through further investments in military mobility.
3. The second ‘Military Mobility Pledge 2024’, adopted by Member States through the Council Conclusions on security and defence in May 2024² complements and reinforces the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0. Within the updated Council pledge, Member States will implement 13 concrete commitments, before the end of 2026, *inter alia*, prioritising investments in transport infrastructure benefitting military movements, accelerating cross-border movement permissions and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation.
4. This second progress report on the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 reflects the ongoing work of the different Union institutions, bodies and agencies to implement the identified actions across the main priority areas of the Action Plan. It also encompasses, where necessary, the progress made in the different areas since the last progress report from November 2023³.
5. The Action Plan provides a strategic approach aimed to effectively involve a wide range of stakeholders, including Member States. It thus facilitates the consistent and linkages between the Member States’ activities – including through the relevant PESCO projects, notably on Military Mobility and Logistical Hubs⁴ – and EU-level work strands across the full range of topics. Annual events on military mobility continue to take place as set out in

¹ [Action plan on military mobility 2.0.pdf \(europa.eu\)](#)

² [Council Conclusions on EU Security and Defence of 27 May 2024](#)

³ Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility from November 2022 to October 2023 – JOIN(2023) 37

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0037>

⁴ Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations

the Action Plan. From 22 to 23 February 2024 the second annual event took place in Ghent under the auspices of the Belgian Presidency of the Council, bringing together experts from EU institutions and Member States, relevant PESCO projects and partners such as NATO.

II – MULTI-MODAL CORRIDORS AND LOGISTICAL HUBS

A. Funding for dual-use transport infrastructure

6. Under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027, a budget of approximately EUR 1.7 billion was allocated (75% less than the EUR 6.5 billion the Commission initially proposed) to co-fund dual-use transport infrastructure through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Initially it was planned that the Commission would launch yearly calls for project proposals under a dedicated CEF Military Mobility envelope with EUR 330 million indicative budgets.
7. The first (of three) call for proposals under this dedicated Military Mobility envelope was in 2021 and the third call for proposals was in May 2023. Under this call EU co-funding to of EUR 807 million was allocated to 38 projects in 18 Member States⁵. The dedicated military mobility envelope under the CEF has been exhausted.
8. In total, the CEF awarded co-funding worth EUR 1.76bn to 95 projects in 21 Member States. Figures 1 and 2 give a full overview of the projects selected over the three calls, the distribution of funding by transport mode and location throughout the EU.

Figure 1: CEF military mobility funding by transport mode





Figure 2: Geographic spread of CEF military mobility projects



⁵ Commission Implementing Decision of 7.3.2024 on the selection of Military Mobility projects following the 2023 call for proposals for grants under the Connecting Europe Facility - Transport sector pursuant to Implementing Decision C(2023) 4886, { C(2024) 1421 final }; a full overview of selected projects is available under [this link](#).

9. In the current MFF period, transport infrastructure projects can receive funding through the CEF ‘General and Cohesion’ envelope. In the calls launched on 24 September 2024, dual-use projects will be granted priority in the evaluation phase. In line with the renewed Military Mobility Pledge 2024, the Commission therefore actively encourages the Member States and project promoters to submit project proposals that would benefit not only civilian use, but also military mobility.
10. Under the Military mobility project, promoters can still benefit from loans under the European Investment Bank’s “Strategic European Security Initiative PLUS” fund. In 2024, the Bank broadened its “dual use” requirements for loans, so that more security and defence investments are eligible for funding, including in the area of military mobility. The Bank has shown an interest in using the Commission’s priority military mobility corridors (see recital 16) as a sound basis for selecting and prioritising investments in military mobility transport infrastructure.

B. Revision of the Trans-European Transport Networks Regulation

11. On 14 December 2021, the Commission presented its proposal to revise the trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) Regulation⁶. On 27 July 2022 the Commission presented an amended proposal reflecting the changed geopolitical situation.⁷ Following negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament under the ordinary legislative procedure, the amended proposal was finally adopted on 13 June 2024 and the Regulation entered into force on 18 July 2024.⁸
12. The Regulation contains four key elements to support military mobility within and beyond the EU. Firstly, it anchors within EU law the notion of a military mobility transport network; secondly, through its new Article 48 on military mobility, it mandates the Commission to identify priority military mobility corridors; thirdly, it sets the TEN-T on the path of becoming a largely dual-use transport infrastructure network, notably by requiring the Member States to consider military mobility needs when constructing or upgrading infrastructure on the TEN-T; and fourthly, it strengthens and aligns several transport infrastructure requirements with Military Requirements, especially for rail; and in some instances the updated maps also reflect the military needs, most notably with extensions into neighbouring countries Ukraine and Moldova.

C. Long-term infrastructure planning for short-notice and large-scale movements of military forces

13. As per the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0, the relevant Commission services and the EEAS, together with the Member States and upon consultation with NATO, carried out a ‘study to identify possibilities for short-notice, large-scale movements to improve fuel

⁶ Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (COM (2021) 812).

⁷ Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 (COM(2022) 384 final).

⁸ Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L, 2024/1679, 28.6.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj>

resilience, long-term infrastructure planning and optimal use of this infrastructure’ (the ‘Study’). This call for action was based on the lessons learned from the first calls for infrastructure projects under the CEF Military Mobility envelope. While major improvements had been achieved by funding projects through the CEF (see paragraph 6 and following), a more strategic approach would help build a better-structured and more coherent military mobility network.

14. In a non-paper of June 2023, initially presented to both the European Union Military Committee and the Politico-Military Group in 2023 and to the Political and Security Committee in February 2024, the Commission services and the EEAS set out a three-step approach to complete the Study; (i) the first step was to identify the main corridors for short-notice and large-scale movements of military personnel and materiel in the event of a crisis or conflict or for military exercises; (ii) the second step to identify gaps in the infrastructure on the main corridors identified as priority for military movements and: (iii) the third step to identify the actions to close the gaps and ensure that military personnel and materiel can move smoothly for military purposes.
15. The Commission, together with the EU Military Staff representing the EEAS, held two meetings with Member States, in October 2023 and July 2024, each time followed by consultations with NATO, in particular with the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany. On this basis, the Commission services and the EEAS finalised the identification of priority military mobility corridors (the first step of the Study) and have started to work on the identification of the gaps in the infrastructure (the second step of the Study) and the calculation of the investment needs to mitigate those gaps (third step of the Study).
16. The four priority military mobility corridors⁹ identified were presented to and subsequently endorsed by the EU Military Committee in October 2024. These new priority corridors were included in the revised Annex II of the Military Requirements, which were adopted by the Council on 17 March. The corridors can better guide and prioritise future investments in the military mobility network at both EU and national levels. The study will also serve as a basis for the European Investment Bank to identify (in close cooperation with the Commission) dual-use projects with high added value for defence. The ongoing assessment of investment needs will serve as a key reference for the discussions on the next MFF.

D. Military Requirements

17. To further align standards of the TEN-T and the EU military transport network, on 23 October 2023 the Council adopted the revised military requirements including Annex II “Multi-Modal Transport Corridors”. The revision process included consultations with NATO. The enlarged scope of military requirements encompasses: (i) logistics hubs; (ii) the supply-chain infrastructure for fuel; (iii) lessons identified from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; and (iv) military criteria for the evaluation of dual-use infrastructural project proposals.
18. The Study on priority military mobility corridors referred to in paragraph 13 resulted in the need to further update Annex II of the Military Requirements for Military Mobility for two

⁹ Northern, Central Northern, Central Southern and Eastern Corridors.

reasons: to include the priority military mobility corridors identified by the Study, and to ensure the transport infrastructure along these identified corridors had dual-use (TEN-T & military) status, where necessary. The new revision of Annex II was launched in October 2024 and adopted by the Council on 17 March 2025.

19. Meeting in the Oil Coordination Group, the Commission services, the EU Military Staff, and Member States, discussed how on oil infrastructure could support military mobility. Member States exchanged national practices and identified possible bottlenecks in military fuel logistics along the military corridors. The Commission services gave Member States a questionnaire on the topic. Its analysis of the replies will be used as a basis for further discussions on how existing oil infrastructure (e.g. strategic oil stocks) can support military mobility.
20. The specifications for Fuel-Supply Chain Infrastructure for fuel set out in the Military Requirements for Military Mobility, within and beyond the EU, also identify future-proof alternative fuel concepts. In the context of the global energy transition, these alternative-fuel concepts would reduce external dependencies for EU armed forces on fossil fuel suppliers. These concepts were discussed in military mobility staff-to-staff meetings which the Commission services and the EU Military Staff held with NATO. The subject was also discussed in an EU-NATO climate and security workshop on the energy transition. These discussions pointed to the importance of developing secure Europe-based alternative-fuel supply chains and the corresponding technological and industrial base required by these alternative fuels.

E. Access to airspace and airspace navigation services and other modes of transport

21. Commitment No 5 of the Military Mobility Pledge 2024 is to “[e]nsure a prioritised access of the armed forces to relevant transport modes, networks and assets, including required airspace, also through the EU regulatory framework, in support of national efforts, most notably in times of crisis and conflict and where possible already in peacetime, in full respect of the sovereignty of EU Member States over their national territory and national decision-making processes regarding military movements.” The EU institutions have worked to facilitate the implementation of this commitment.
22. Firstly, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the relevant Commission services have continued their cooperation to ensure access to airspace and air navigation services for civil and military aviation as part of the Single European Sky (SES) and the related project to modernise the management of air traffic (SESAR), in coordination with the SESAR Joint Undertaking and the SESAR Deployment Manager. Any lack of interoperability between military and civil systems threatens the military’s access to airspace and use of navigation services. This could also be a challenge, in cases when the military is providing services to civilian users. Growing issues with jamming and spoofing have also highlighted the need for a resilient Minimum Operational Network of Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) ground systems as backup systems in the event of disruptive events, to guarantee military mobility by air 24/7. Aviation and air traffic management were included in the Military Mobility initiative (as reflected in the previous update of the Military Requirements¹⁰) in recognition of their importance for overcoming interoperability gaps

¹⁰ Revised Annex II of the Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the EU (ST 11373/19) of 27 March 2023.

and to ensure resilience of the air traffic management/CNS services. The Implementing Regulation on dual-use requirements¹¹ allowed the military aviation community to take part in CEF military mobility calls for proposals (two airport-related projects were awarded funding in 2024).

23. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has also advanced work to improve the interchangeability of (spare) parts between the civil and military aviation industry. The development of a Certification Memorandum will clarify the conditions and facilitate the future dual-use certification of maintenance of aircraft parts and equipment. However, certification authority on defence matters is a Member States' prerogative and Member States' national authorities oversee the respective certification requirements. Civil-military cooperation is focused on the integration of air traffic management. From a certification perspective, the EDA chairs the Military Airworthiness Authorities Forum, which produces the European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs). The Member States National Military Airworthiness Authorities use these EMARs for their regulations. The development of EMARs tailored for Military Airworthiness, based on the Cooperation Arrangement and subsequent continuing work programme between the EDA and EASA, are in line with the most recent EASA regulations. The same principle will be applied to Military Airworthiness and the certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems where relevant, to minimise the national regulatory differences between Member States and the differences between European programmes.
24. Lastly, in July 2023, DG MOVE tabled a revision of the Rail Capacity Regulation¹², which harmonises EU rules for rail infrastructure capacity and traffic management, considering the needs of Ministries of Defence received through the EDA. The proposed revision contains a new provision allowing for the cancellation of railroad track access rights without compensation, in the case of a last-minute crisis request by the armed forces. Similar exceptions are provided for exercises simulating crisis situations. Following the adoption by the European Parliament of its report on 12 March 2024, and the adoption by the Council of its General Approach on 18 June 2024, the first Trilogue meeting was held on 19 November 2024.

III – REGULATORY SUPPORT MEASURES

A. Permissions for cross-border movement

25. The EDA Category A-Programme on “Optimising Cross-Border Movement Permission Procedures in Europe” is progressing well to simplify and harmonise military mobility procedures across Europe. To date, 27 contributing Member States, including Norway, have signed the Programme Arrangement for cross-border movement permissions. The Technical Arrangements (TAs) for Surface and Air have been signed by 26 and 25 contributing Member States respectively (including Norway). Recent updates to the TA Surface forms have further streamlined the process for obtaining annual diplomatic

¹¹ Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1328 of 10 August 2021 specifying the infrastructure requirements applicable to certain categories of dual-use infrastructure actions pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council, C(2021) 5859, OJ L 288, 11.8.2021.

¹² COM(2023) 443/2; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of railway infrastructure capacity in the single European railway area, amending Directive 2012/34/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) No 913/2010; available [here](#).

clearances. The ‘TA Sea’ for the maritime domain is in an advanced state of negotiation. It will also trigger an amendment of the Programme Arrangement.

26. To support the implementation of the signed TAs, the EDA has developed an Implementation Monitoring Matrix which allows to monitor the progress of the implementation of the various activities under the TAs. Moreover, the network of national point-of-contacts for military mobility will provide valuable feedback from the Member States for future amendments. The EDA will work together with the Member States to facilitate the full implementation of the TAs and to test the Surface TAs template developed for annual permissions.
27. On the cross-border permission TA utilisation, Member States are coordinating their national efforts on a strategic level through the PESCO project on Military Mobility. This has led to the establishment of a National Point of Contact Network which is expected to be the primary user of the EDAs Cross Border Movement Permission TAs.
28. Based on first consultations with the coordinating Member States of the two PESCO projects, “Military Mobility” and “Network of Logistic Hubs”, in late 2023 the EDA, along with the Commission, developed a concept to create synergies between both projects. This concept uses the TENtec viewer to highlight the gaps in - and needs of - Logistics Hubs along military corridors in Europe. Based on these results, the PESCO project “Network of Logistic Hubs” should provide additional - potentially temporary - Logistic Hubs to support military movement on these corridors. Both PESCO projects are considering the EDA’s suggestion.
29. In January 2024, three¹³ Member States signed a Letter of Intent for a common Enablement and Sustainment (ESN) corridor, in close cooperation with NATO. The objective is to facilitate the more effective movement of military personnel and equipment from North Sea Ports to NATO’s Eastern Flank. The Deutsch-Netherlands-Office is identifying, including through live exercises, obstacles to the fast movement of troops and military materiel across this ESN corridor, and proposing solutions for addressing these obstacles, including simplification and harmonisation of rules and mutual recognition of cross-border procedures. This ‘military mobility areas’ will serve as a model for similar solutions on other ESN corridors. Another two military mobility areas agreements were signed¹⁴ at the NATO summit in Washington in July 2024, while three more have also now been signed¹⁵. All these initiatives, ideas and progress came from the various EU and Member State military mobility stakeholder meetings and events.

B. Digitalisation of logistical processes

30. Work continues on the European Defence Fund (EDF) project for a Secure Digital Military Mobility System (SDMMS) for exchanging information related to military mobility. The project is receiving EUR 9 million in funding from the EDF. The Netherlands joined the Estonian-led project in 2024, which already consisted of companies from nine Member

¹³ Poland – Netherlands – Germany

¹⁴ Italy – Albania - North Macedonia - Bulgaria – Romania and Greece - Bulgaria - Romania

¹⁵ Iceland - Norway - Sweden – Finland – Denmark and Italy – Slovenia – Croatia – Hungary and Romania – Bulgaria - Türkiye

States¹⁶ plus Norway. Slovakia is in talks on potentially joining, while Estonia is prepared to bring more countries into the project, which would be very beneficial to the SDMMS.

31. The overall duration of the project was initially for 30 months, from 1 January 2023 to 31 May 2025. Due to a delay in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, the system will not be available by mid-2025 as initially planned. The project is expected to be finalised by the end of 2025, and it will facilitate the direct and secure exchange of information between participating governments requesting and approving any military movement.

C. Customs

32. In March 2024 the “Assessment of the Needs, Gains, and Risks for the Development of a Military Customs System” was developed by the EDA and the contributing Member States, with advisory input from the Commission. As a second phase of the related EDA Programme Arrangement on Harmonising Military Requirements related to Customs, the EDA has launched a study aimed at determining the technical specifications and requirements for the digitalisation of military customs processes. The study includes a discussion on using electronic data processing to facilitate efficient information exchange between military forces and customs authorities. The findings of this study, combined with the results of the SDMMS project, will be assessed by the EDA and the contributing Members States. Additionally, the EDA is also working with NATO to assess the possibility of digitising NATO Form 302 and incorporating it into the Military Customs System. The Commission is expecting the first tangible results in relation to such a system. The Commission will then assess the need to prepare legal amendments to EU Customs Legislation which would set out a legal framework for Member States’ use of a digitalised EU Form 302.

D. Enhanced logistics

33. In September 2024, the second study was presented, proposing how to connect the various Member State IT applications for military logistics to a federated logistic communication network, to enable the exchange and sharing of logistics data between participants. A follow-on study, scheduled to commence in 2025, will draw up a comprehensive list of IT applications used by commercial logistics operators and will identify how to embed their IT applications in a wider common secure network. The Logistics IT Systems project does not aim to replace the various IT applications in use. Its strategic objective is to provide an architecture to connect various applications and make it possible to embed future applications within this architecture.
34. On the use of Additive Manufacturing (AM) – commonly known as 3D printing in the context of military logistics – the EDA Category B Project “Additive Manufacturing for Logistic support” established in November 2023 aims to draw up and determine common standards to enable interchangeability of AM manufactured parts. To support these activities, the EDA has conducted various studies on legal issues related to the AM and AM data management, which were presented in the course of 2024. In 2025, the EDA will conduct another study providing a harmonised AM training concept to ensure interoperability in the provision of services and logistics support.

¹⁶ Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Bulgaria, Poland, Luxembourg, Romania, Czech Republic, Latvia.

IV – RESILIENCE AND PREPAREDNESS

A. Strategic lift capabilities

35. The EDA has continued work to develop the necessary sea and air transport/air lift capabilities, in line with the 2020 Report on the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and in association with relevant PESCO projects. The PESCO project on Future Mid-size Tactical Cargo has produced two documents to guide industrial development and a study funded under the 2022 EDF Work Programme. The Strategic Air Transport Outsized Cargo PESCO project has developed the high-level common requirements while the call for a study in this domain under the 2023 EDF Work Programme will be launched in December 2024. The Next Generation Medium Helicopter PESCO project started in June 2023 and is currently analysing Member States' inputs for their future plans for helicopters, for both upgrading existing fleets and developing new platforms.
36. In 2025 the EDA will launch two studies; (i) a study to assess the current availability of national and commercial rail assets used by the military and identify potential needs for specialised rail transport and infrastructure, while also evaluating national and EU legislation against military needs and; (ii) a study to evaluate key infrastructure on inland waterway transport and the capacity for military movement.

B. Protection against security risks

37. At the Council request¹⁷, the Commission services, the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group and the EEAS are developing cybersecurity risk scenarios. In July 2024, the group published a risk assessment report on the cyber resilience of the EU's telecommunications and electricity sectors¹⁸. Other critical sectors, such as transport, will be assessed in future editions. A resilient and robust data-sharing network with a high level of cybersecurity is necessary to support effective sharing of digital data among relevant civilian and military stakeholders and operators. Such a network could make the most of EU infrastructure such as the EU Secure Connectivity Programme (IRIS²).
38. In January 2024, the Commission tabled a proposal to revise the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) Regulation¹⁹, to better protect EU security and public order by proposing improved screening of foreign investment into the EU. In a changing geopolitical context, it is in the shared interest of all Member States to promote the effective screening of foreign investments in EU firms that provide critical technologies, infrastructure or inputs, or hold sensitive information, and whose activities are critical for security or public order at EU level. From a military mobility perspective, it is important that the proposed revision of the FDI Regulation includes a clear reference to the TEN-T as a “project or programme of EU interest” that requires Member States or the Commission to consider whether associated foreign direct investments are likely to negatively affect the TEN-T on grounds of security

¹⁷ Council Conclusions on the development of the European Union's Cyber Posture; ST09364/22, 23 May 2022.

¹⁸ NIS Cooperation Group: EU cybersecurity risk evaluation and scenarios for the telecommunications and electricity sectors. <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/107357>

¹⁹ Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the screening of foreign investments in the Union and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2024) 23 final); available [here](#).

or public order. This will allow the Commission and Member States to better identify, assess and mitigate potential risks to security or public order resulting from a proposed foreign direct investment into key EU transport infrastructure.

39. In the context of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS), work has continued to explore how to increase the use of renewable energy sources in transportation. This work also addresses the aims of the Joint Communication on a New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus, adopted in June 2023²⁰, which tasked the EEAS, Commission services and the EDA to analyse ways to reduce reliance on fossil fuels in military transportation by promoting the adoption of renewable energy sources and associated technologies. Four examples of this analysis work are set out in the bullet points below:

- Several CF SEDSS Phase III deliverables (research studies, defence energy-related project ideas and the guidance document on advancing sustainable energy) published in 2024 explored a range of topics. These included alternatives to fossil fuels and successful decarbonisation practices for transport, military requirements for hydrogen-based solutions for heavy military logistic vehicles and the impact of climate change and the transition to green energy on the resilience and energy security of defence-related critical energy infrastructure, including military transport infrastructure.
- The CF SEDSS Phase III Study on Decarbonising the Defence Sector – Challenges and Opportunities investigated alternatives to fossil fuels developed for short and medium-range road transportation. It also looked into data collection and monitoring for all energy use, including transport (e.g. for calculating the rate of renewable energy consumption), and funding sources for upgraded mobility and the related challenges.
- The ‘Study on Defining the Key Requirements for an Energy Storage Selection Decision Support Tool for Homeland Defence Installations’ offered solutions on ways to match appropriate energy storage technologies with various applications, including transport (both light use - vehicles under 3 tonnes - and heavy use - vehicles over 3 tonnes).
- Phase III of CF SEDSS finished on 30 September 2024, but these considerations will continue to be explored in Phase IV (1 October 2024 to 30 September 2028).

V – PARTNERSHIPS

A. EU-NATO

40. The EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility convened in November 2023 and June 2024, brought together the relevant staff from both organisations. It is an effective framework to present and update on the latest developments, while also an opportunity to exploring areas of further cooperation, with a view to ensuring coherence and mutual reinforcement. NATO participated at the EDAs Military Mobility Symposium in January

²⁰ Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: a new outlook on the climate and security nexus: addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence {JOIN(2023) 19 final}.

2024 and NATO staff attended an EDA meeting on the digitalisation of military customs process related to the EU/NATO Customs Form 302. NATO representatives also participated in the second annual Military Mobility event in June 2024 and NATO's Joint Support Enablement Command attends relevant meetings of the PESCO project on Military Mobility on an informal basis.

41. The participation of non-EU NATO allies in relevant PESCO projects continues to provide added value, including from a transatlantic and EU-NATO perspective. In addition to the United States, Canada, Norway and the UK, the Council is considering adopting a decision to authorise inviting Switzerland to participate in the PESCO project on Military Mobility. Although the Administrative Arrangement between the project and the UK is pending conclusion, the UK does attend all relevant project meetings as an "incoming third state partner". The Administrative Arrangement for Canada's participation in the Network Logistical Hubs PESCO Project was concluded in May 2024.

B. Connecting to other partners

42. Following its revision, the TEN-T Regulation now extends the European transport corridors to Ukraine and Moldova. The extension of the corridors builds on the EU's efforts to strengthen these countries' transport connectivity with the EU, such as the 'Solidarity Lanes' initiative the Commission launched in May 2022 to help Ukraine keep its trade routes open following Russia's blockade of Ukrainian ports.
43. On 30 January 2024, the EDA, in cooperation with the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU, held a High-level Symposium on Military Mobility in Brussels. The event brought together senior officials, including the EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and several EU defence ministers. Representatives from NATO and the United States also participated, underscoring the importance of transatlantic cooperation in improving military mobility. The discussions focused on the challenges posed by the changing security environment, highlighting the need for greater collaboration among EU Member States and international partners.

VI – CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

44. The Draghi Report²¹ of September 2024 on the future of EU competitiveness reiterates the arguments that were previously detailed in the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 and the commitments made by Member States in the Military Mobility Pledge 2024. The most notable of these arguments is transport infrastructure is a strategic consideration for Member States' armed forces to respond quickly and at scale to crises, within and beyond the EU's borders. The Niinistö Report²² of October 2024 on strengthening Europe's civil and military preparedness and readiness ("Safer together: Strengthening Europe's civilian and military preparedness and readiness") identifies Military Mobility as a model for improved EU dual-use policy, and it recommends to develop this capability further.
45. Two years into the implementation of the Action Plan on Military 2.0, relevant actions have been launched across the four main priority areas, demonstrating continued progress and

²¹ https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en.

²² https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf

reflecting the shared sense of urgency in light of regional and global security crises and challenges. To achieve the common objective of a well-functioning military mobility network, all relevant stakeholders must continue their respective actions as part of a coordinated whole-of-government approach. The updated Military Mobility Pledge 2024 by Member States, will further contribute to this aim, building on the work of relevant PESCO projects within the wider scope of the Action Plan.

46. The High Representative and the Commission will present the next Progress Report by the end of 2025.